Posts Tagged ‘Michael Lewis’

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Fantasy Baseball Stat School

July 12th, 2010

Welcome to the first edition of Stat School.

Every Wednesday, I’ll be taking you through one crucial stat that you should be using in your player evaluations and how it affects future performance.

First, it’s important to cover an overarching philosophy on statistics that many fantasy people (and increasingly professional baseball organizations) use every day in their player evaluations.

It’s called Sabermetrics .

It was invented by Bill James in 1980 —an average joe who spent his nights working as a security guard thinking about how we treat baseball stats. In 1977, he first published his thoughts in a book called Baseball Abstracts.

Quickly, people began to realize the logic in his theories, to the point where major league organizations began using them as well. The most famous instance being Billy Beane ’s use of Sabermetrics with the Oakland Athletics, chronicled in Michael Lewis ’ book Moneyball .

James sums up his theory as the “the search for objective knowledge in baseball .”

Basically, the goal is to eliminate the subjective elements of a player’s numbers and focus as much as possible on the player’s ability to help score runs. A

fter all, that is the ultimate goal of the game.

Learn the rest here .

 

 

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How The Blue Jays Are Winning: The New Money-Ball

June 8th, 2010

Since Michael Lewis’ Moneyball came out in 2003 detailing Billy Beane and his strategy as GM of the Oakland A’s, we’ve all heard a lot about the philosophy that changed baseball.

We’ve heard about college scouting, OPS, patient hitting and Sabermetrics. We’ve heard about Jeremy Brown, Nick Swisher, Paul DePodesta and Theo Epstein. Above all, we’ve heard how the way to compete as a small-market team is to focus on players fitting a certain description: high on-base, lots of home runs and low strikeouts with heavy focus on statistics and none whatsoever on aesthetic appeal.

I’ve got some potentially upsetting news: we’ve all been missing the point.

Amidst all our excitement over the statistical baseball revolution, we’ve forgotten what Moneyball was all about: economics. Michael Lewis isn’t a sportswriter or a statistician. He holds a Masters in Economics from the London School of Economics. And at the end of the day, Moneyball (unitalicized intentionally when I’m talking about the strategy, not the book) isn’t actually about OPS or Kevin Youkilis. It’s about exploiting market inefficiencies.

The thing about the scouting strategies featured in Moneyball is that they only work when nobody else is using them. The idea underlying the A’s thinking is that while the Yankees and Red Sox have unlimited resources, you’re doomed to fail by doing the same things as them.

So Billy Beane did something different. While the rest of the league was focusing on average, RBIs and aesthetics, he focused on statistics, particularly OPS. This is exactly what’s meant by exploiting market inefficiencies – figure out what everybody else is missing and take advantage of it. As a result Beane made a living catching quality players who were falling through the cracks.

The trouble is that the rest of the league has caught on. Boston’s Theo Epstein is one of the top supposed Moneyball minds in the game. Noticed lately how Nick Swisher and Kevin Youkilis – the two players most highly touted in the book – are starting respectively for New York and Boston?

Remember the fundamental premise: you can’t succeed as a small-market team by doing the same things as the big-market teams. To compete, you have to do something different. So in today’s culture, where the big-market teams are focusing on traditional Moneyball stats, playing Moneyball doesn’t dictate going after OPS and patience at the plate – it dictates doing the opposite.

That’s what the Toronto Blue Jays have finally figured out this season. They’ve spent the past six years under JP Ricciardi rigidly refusing to scout high school prospects, looking exclusively at traditional Moneyball stats and essentially acting like Billy Beane acted up until 2002. Like the rest of us, they missed the point.

Under Alex Anthopoulos’ new regime, they’ve done the opposite. They’ve doubled their scouting staff, malcontent to rely on a DePodestean computer. Their draft strategy centres largely around high-risk high-school kids with heavy upside. They began the season by trading away the club’s biggest star in exchange for prospects.

And in case you haven’t noticed, they swing at everything. Moneyball told us never to swing at the first pitch. This year’s Jays tell us to swing at the first pitch as hard as you can, and quite often it’s ended up as a souvenir.

I began this article by saying that when it comes to Moneyball, we’ve been missing the point. Well, that Jays caught on. This is the new Moneyball. In 2002, Kevin Youkilis was slipping through the cracks as the baseball universe ignored plate discipline. Today, while the powers that be are preoccupied with plate discipline, players like Jose Bautista and Alex Gonzales slip through the cracks. The Jays are exploiting that inefficiency by focusing on performance indicators largely ignored by the teams with a financial advantage.

The only difference is that the indicators have changed. Looking back on Moneyball, Lewis absolutely argues OPS and plate discipline are better performance indicators. But the claim that they’re better is beside the point – what’s really fundamental about those stats is that given their dismissal by high-budget teams, they’re more economic. That’s no longer the case. In 2002 plate discipline was undervalued, and Billy Beane took advantage of it. Today discipline is perhaps overvalued – the undervalued assets are mechanics, aggression at the plate and high-school upside. Moneyball accordingly dictates focusing on those indicators instead.

Most people will tell you that swinging at everything, scouting primarily in person rather than through statistics and focusing on high-school players in the draft is a sign the Jays are no-longer playing Moneyball. I say it’s a sign they finally are playing Moneyball – or at least that they’re finally playing it properly. Call it the new Moneyball. And it’s working.

Courtesy Lion's Den University Sports Writer Malcolm 

 

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Posted in Aaron Hill, Adam Lind, Alex Gonzalez, Baseball, MLB, Opinion, Toronto, Vernon Wells, homerun, jose bautista, toronto blue jays

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OBP vs. Extra Bases: What the Oakland A’s Understand Better than Others

April 29th, 2010

In "Moneyball," Michael Lewis reported that former Oakland Athletics' assistant general manager Paul dePodesta believed that extra on base percentage (generated via walks) was worth three times as much as a similar amount of extra slugging percentage (a function of extra bases). The old wisdom was that the ratio was more like 1.50:1 or 3:2.

When I first read that, my reaction was "DePodesta can't be right." That would mean that a walk was worth as much as a triple, an obvious fallacy. Or else, three walks are worth three times as much as the triple. But the latter proposition (and similar ones) might actually be correct, depending on surrounding circumstances.

To do this analysis, I need to introduce some new terms. The first is "run expectation," where the raw data comes courtesy of FanGraphs. That is the expected number of runs that have historically resulted from different combinations of baserunners (up to three) and outs (maximum of three).

For instance, the run expectation at the beginning of an inning, with "none on and none out," is about half a run. That's just all the runs in the history of baseball divided by all the innings. If a man gets on first (by either hit or walk), the run expectation rises to 0.88, or about seven-eighths of a run.

More runners on base increase your run expectation. More outs decrease this metric.

I'll also introduce a term that I call "base capture." That is similar to the more commonly used "total bases," except that walks are included. A walk represents a capture of one base. So does a single. But a double represents TWO total bases, or bases captured, a triple, three, and a home run four.

Using these concepts, an example will illustrate how useful walks are.

Suppose you have two clones for your first four batters. The first clone bats .250, and never walks, but every hit is a home run. The second clone walks every time. After four plate appearances, both sets of clones have captured four bases, using our terminology. The rest of your lineup is drawn at random from all of baseball.

The first clone will hit one home run and make three outs in an inning, for a total of one run per inning. That's a lot. (There will be a few innings with two home runs, and others with three outs before the fourth batter hits a home run, but they'll cancel out.)

The second clone will load the bases, and then walk a man home, thereby scoring one run. But the inning isn't over. Most likely, there will be followup runs.

The run expectation with loaded bases and no outs is 2.33, using random followup batters (our assumption). With the one run in the bank, a lineup headed by the second clone will contribute an average of 3.33 runs in an inning, more than three times as many as the first one.

If two batters walk, capturing two bases, so that you have men on first and second, the run expectation rises to 1.49 from 0.88 for a man on first. A double that captures two bases has a run expectation of only 1.12, because you have only one man on base. The ratio of the first to the second is 1.34, a bit less than 50 percent higher.

But there's another wrinkle. The two walkers have made two plate appearances while the doubler has made only one. What do we do about the second plate appearance? In order to make a valid comparison and hold the bases captured constant at two, we need to assume that the batter behind the double makes an out.

This one fact hugely changes things in favor of the walkers.With a man on second and one out, the run expectation drops to 0.68, less than one-half of the value of two walks.

You can do the exercise with triples and three walks. Loaded bases with none out have a run expectation of 2.33 runs. An inning with a man on third and no outs has a run expectation of 1.40, of which 2.33 is 1.66 times. But add two outs to the equation, to equalize plate appearances, and the run expectation drops to 0.35, a small fraction of 2.33 runs.

Basically, the walkers do two things for the same base capture: 1) They get more men on base for the same number of captured bases. 2) They fail to make outs that lower your run expectation.

The old sabermetricians took into account only the first effect in estimating the extra value of extra walks over extra bases. DePodesta also took into account the second effect, which makes extra walks worth between two to three times an equivalent amount of extra bases.

The A's Jason Giambi was an example of the value of on base percentage (OBP). At his peak, his OBP was .470, twice his mediocre batting average, which means that he got on base, through hit or walk, nearly half the time he showed up at the plate.

Add a certain number of successful sacrifices, and maybe half his plate appearances were "productive." Forget that he also had considerable power—gotten in a dishonorable way (steroids)—by assuming that every hit was a single, and just think about the value of his keen eye.

The Pittsburgh Pirates, on the other hand, tend to trade away players like Rajai Davis, Nate McLouth, and Jose Bautista who have high OBPs and low batting averages (at the time of trade). Forget about the fact that Davis, at least, improved his batting average significantly. All three get on base more than usual, while many member of the existing team do not.

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Posted in Baseball, MLB, Stats, oakland athletics

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Major League Baseball: Finding a Market Inefficiency

March 10th, 2010

While running a major league team, there are only so many ways you can gain a real advantage. Having more capital then your opponent is the easiest way, but teams continually look for other ways to better themselves at an inexpensive price.

This is termed a market inefficiency. Basically, the best thing a team can do is find something of value that isn't being valued properly on the open market.

While many people ignorantly think Michael Lewis's Moneyball is about sabermetrics, this is what it was really about: finding market inefficiencies and using them to your advantage. The biggest example that was used in this case was on-base percentage, which was significantly undervalued at the time.

At this point, something as simple as OBP is valued correctly. In recent years we've seen teams like the Mariners shift to optimizing defense at a well below-market rate.

It seemed that this was the new market inefficiency, but this seemed to right itself quickly. This offseason, we saw Boston look to improve their defense through free agency by acquiring defensive specialists Adrian Beltre and Mike Cameron while moving Jacoby Ellsbury to left field.

While Boston may seem to be a continuation of getting defense on the cheap, they actually didn't pay too much below market value with these two signings. This suggests that teams are much more aware of the impact defense can have and it can no longer be seen as a market inefficiency.

These things work in cycles. It's very hard to find a way to game the market consistently without other teams catching up to you. In a recent post on FanGraphs, Dave Cameron talked about efficiency wages . In his piece, he briefly mentions nutrition without getting into it too much.

See, MLB just raised the minor league per diem five dollars all the way to $25 per day. Now, if you're eating for one and cooking your own meals, that's fine. I cook many of my own meals and spend less than $25 a day.

The issue here is that these are not people who live on a regular schedule. They're not working nine to five jobs; they're traveling all around whatever region they're in and end up eating out for many of their meals. Now you can see why that's a struggle. If you want three meals on $25...you're going to be getting food that is neither nutritious nor particularly good.

Dave suggests a widespread increase of quality of life for minor leaguers. He proposes that you not only raise the per diem, but you get better buses as well. For the Yankees, these two things should be a no-brainer. Having updated, comfortable buses for each minor league affiliate would cost relative pennies for the Yankees. We can't be sure how much this would benefit the team in the long run but improving the day-to-day life of the team's prospects can't hurt.

This also got me to thinking about the recent film Sugar, which follows a young pitching prospect out of the Dominican Republic. Now, I don't want to spoil the film for you if you haven't seen it yet (and I recommend you do ), but the character Sugar could have benefited from these things and many more.

 

My Recommendation for the Yanks

With the Yankees' financial advantage, they should take this whole idea a step further. Considering that they are so active in the international free agent market, they'd benefit the most from it anyway. Instead of just increasing the per diem, encourage players to eat healthy. Maybe if there is a restaurant in an area a team is visiting that specializes in healthy food, offer incentives to eat there.

When the team is home, serve healthy foods. Substitute regular pasta, white rice, and white bread out; replace them with whole wheat pasta, brown rice, and whole grain bread. Obviously, I'd take it a bit further, but you get the point. Simple changes like that would not even cost very much, but would increase the health of the players.

I haven't spent enough time around the low minor leagues to know what goes on in Low-A ball, but teams should go out of their way to make sure that the prospects are comfortable and happy. In Sugar, we saw that might not always be the case.

This would not only benefit the players currently in the system. It's possible that young ballplayers would be even more attracted to signing with the Yankees because they offer a better quality of life.

As the first commenter on Dave's post points out, this would probably end up causing other teams to follow suit, which would just raise prices all around. If that happens, then so be it.

This would just mean that corporate suits end up with a little less money while these 18-year-old kids in A-ball get an increase in their quality of life. I know I don't have a problem with that.

If other teams didn't follow, then the Yankees could have found themselves another efficient way to spend their money as they streamline talent to the major league team.

Find more great content at Pending Pinstripes .

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Jack Zduriencik’s Seattle Mariners and His Moneyball

February 25th, 2010

A quick group "Aww" for that picture.

Awwwwwwwww!!!

Anyway, the term "Moneyball" was coined by Michael Lewis in his book Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game .

The book is mainly about the Oakland Athletics' revolutionary (at the time) idea of using sabermetics to construct a competitive baseball team in spite of their payroll disadvantages.

A thought came to me on my way home today. I was trying to brainstorm ideas for ways the Seahawks could find undervalued pieces on the market, an act they must master, and they have a pretty good head start on it (woo Alex Gibbs!).

Then my mind, for whatever reason, turned to the Mariners. Just as quickly, I realized something that had been staring me in the face for months now.

Jack Zduriencik has found a new inefficiency in the market. He has changed the meaning of finding undervalued talent.

Forget UZR, VORP, WAR, FIP, .WOBA, tRA, etc. The undervalued player in this market is not one with a high OBP, but with a high temper and stacked police record.

Milton Bradley, Daniel Cortes, and Ian Snell all have had personal problems not too long ago. They're all extremely talented, but their former respective teams felt the risk out-weighed the reward.

Not Jack. He snatched them up on the cheap, unloading Yuniesky Betancourt for Dan Cortes (!) and Carlos Silva for Milton Bradley (!!).

Teams will pay attention to the Northwest after this year. They'll realize that ol' Jacky Z got 'em good (again) and they to will try this new found idea out.

At this time, most teams aren't constructed to take advantage of the current market's inefficiencies. They may take in headcases, but they don't get much out of their investment. They lack excellent clubhouse chemistry. Only one team can have Ken Griffey Jr., right?

So, if anyone is wondering, that's why Ken was brought back. You might be able to get a slight upgrade over him as a pinch hitter, but it doesn't compare to how much better he'll make this team.

In sabermetric language, an upgrade over Griffey would provide at most one more WAR. With Griffey and all that comes with him, the likes of Milton Bradley, Ichiro, Ian Snell, as well as willingness to experiment with the infield a bit, can reward us with an extra five to eight more WAR.

Chemistry counts. With good chemistry, you can take chances and still win ballgames.

If I'm late to the party and you've already reached this conclusion, my apologies. There's worse ways to spend three minutes, right?

 

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Posted in Baseball, Ken Griffey Jr., MLB, Opinion, Seattle Mariners

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